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Introduction 
 
In this paper I examine some of what might be considered the domain 
assumptions on the nature of corporate crime and corporate behaviour that 
are either explicit or implicit in many of the papers presented here and that 
indeed characterise debates in the literature on criminology about the 
behaviour of corporations and other powerful organisations. I wish to argue 
that many of the points put forward to defend the distinctiveness of corporate 
misbehaviour and that are said to make it unsuitable for regulation through the 
criminal law and through the processes of criminal justice are in fact open to 
serious dispute and that what distinguishes corporate behaviour is not 
something that is inherent in its nature but resides most decisively in the 
social judgements that are made about the kinds of people who are involved 
in illegal corporate behaviour. It is not some quality of their behaviour that 
renders them “unsuitable” for the criminal justice system and for criminal 
justice sanctions but the fact that they come from certain kinds of social 
backgrounds. It is this that renders prison “inappropriate” for them. 
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The assumptions that are involved in the attempt to argue for a behavioural 
distinctiveness for corporate crime are numerous. I wish to consider three of 
these. They are the question of the nature of crime and whether there is some 
essence to behaviour that makes it criminal, the issue of the nature of the 
enforcement process against corporate offenders and why it is so poor, and 
the issue of the effectiveness of criminal sanctions against corporate 
offenders. There are other issues that could be considered. For example, the 
question of whether the complexity of cases involving corporate crime makes 
it too difficult for juries to understand does merit extended consideration. It too 
contain traces of attitudes to class in the way it assumes that juries drawn 
from all sectors of the population might not be able to understand the nature 
of the evidence in the way in which a jury drawn from the professional middle 
class might. As such it underestimates the degree to which juries in the recent 
Securicor robbery trial and the case against Joe O’Reilly were able to assess 
complex technical evidence and arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. 
 
It is necessary at this stage to clarify certain terms. The literature on corporate 
crime is replete with attempts to define what the key terms mean, a debate 
that goes back to the origins of the concern with white collar crime in the work 
of Edwin Sutherland 1  and his subsequent exchanges with, most notably, Paul 
Tappan 2 though, as Cottino 3 shows, the term has a somewhat longer 
parentage. For present purposes crime involving corporate behaviour can be 
divided in two. The first are crimes committed against corporations such as 
fraud and embezzlement by employees or by the public. As such, these fit 
reasonably comfortably into conventional criminal law. The second are crimes 
committed by corporations and as such involve corporate robbery, where 
corporations rob the public through offences like false advertising, tax evasion 
and the bribery of public officials, and corporate violence where corporations 
cause injury, death and destruction through neglect of health and safety 
legislation, the production and manufacture of dangerous products, and 
through the ways in which their products and production processes can cause 
serious environmental and social damage. It is this latter sense of the term 
that guides this discussion.  
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It is also necessary to point out that while criminological knowledge is 
relatively underdeveloped in Ireland, it is particularly so in the area of 
corporate behaviour. To the extent that we have accumulated such 
knowledge it tends to be about conventional criminal behaviour such as public 
order 4 , car theft 5 , and juvenile offending 6 . This means that any discussion 
about corporate crime has to rely on material from other jurisdictions, most 
notably the United States, Britain, Australia and Finland. The inclusion of this 
latter country may, to the parochial mind, seem surprising but corporate crime 
here has been a matter of extensive policy analysis and debate, activated and 
energised by the collapse of its banking system in the early 1990s. 7 
 
Crime and Its Essence 
 
The debate on corporate crime has been marked by the notion because crime 
has some obvious essence that makes it “criminal” it is obvious that some 
forms of behaviour are quite clearly criminal and suitable for treatment by the 
criminal justice system and other are not. This point of view is often bolstered 
by reference to common sense and to what the public would accept is 
“criminal”. The difficulty in this position is that there is not essence, the 
presence of which defines an act as criminal. Any kind of social or historical 
consideration shows that the criminal law is a social product and as such 
open to a range of influences but disproportionately to those of powerful social 
forces and social actors. Working with a strict definition of crime ignores this 
and with it the role of these powerful social elites play in shaping the nature of 
the law and in shaping where the distinction arises between criminal and 
corporate offences and between legal corporate behaviour and illegal 
corporate behaviour.  As McBarnet8 puts it, “we need to explore how 
economic elites actively use the institutions, ideologies and methods of law to 
secure immunity from legal control”. Corporations can in effect manipulate the 
boundaries between lawful and unlawful behaviour, a practice that has no 
counterpart in “ordinary crime”.  
 
This has been shown in a notable article by Snider9. She has outlined how 
many countries, most notably the United States and Canada, acting under the 
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influence of neo-liberal ideologies and under the guise of deregulation, 
effectively speaking “dissolved” the problem of corporate misbehaviour. The 
disappearance of corporate crime was achieved through major changes in the 
laws regulating corporate behaviour, in her phrase, “less state regulation, 
fewer and weaker laws, less state-sponsored censure”. It is the “deregulation, 
decriminalization and downsizing of corporate crime”10. 
 
State regulation and punishment was replaced either by a more “educational 
and advisory approach, by self regulation or by passing the problem on to the 
operation of “market forces”. What she calls the “corporate counter revolution” 
was “grounded in arguments associated with monetarism and the neo-liberal 
economics of the ‘Chicago School’11 under which the state “had no role 
except to get out of the way”. 
 
Enron provides one of the best examples of this in the United States. 
Corporations did not, as Tillman12 puts it, “just break the rules they made the 
rules”, they did not simply “react to imperfect markets but were part of the 
political process that created these markets”. He gives three examples of how 
corporations shaped the rules under which they were regulated and then 
benefited from this process. Pressure from industrial lobbies meant that the 
California Electrical market was in the late 1990s effectively free from 
government regulation. This allowed for the deliberate withholding of 
electricity from the market to drive up the price, the submission of false bids in 
energy auctions and the creating of congestion on energy lines to maximise 
their payments from individual states. These changes were facilitated by 
payments to politicians. The other two involved energy derivatives and stock 
options, both of which were used to falsely inflate sales figures, increase 
executive bonuses and facilitate tax evasion. 
 
This process of the degree to which regulation is “a facilitative weapon for the 
powerful” in Britain is provided by MacKenzie and Green’s13 analysis of 
regulation in the antiques industry. Here the considerable and acknowledged 
illegal trade in stolen antiques subsequently offered for public sale through 
antique dealers provoked public concern and a political desire to do 
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something about it. However their research shows the form that the relevant 
legislation took and the process that was selected to implement it was one 
that was significantly shaped by the industry and was generally agreed to be 
unlikely to interfere with the trade in illegal antiques. As such this illustrates 
two points about regulation. One is the degree to which legislation that 
appears to challenge the behaviour of powerful interests is “designed to be 
ineffective”14. The other is the way in which it illustrates the process of what 
Mackenzie and Green call, “prelegislative intervention: the legitimized 
manipulation and neutralization by white collar marketers of laws directed at 
them” 15. 
 
An example of how corporate interest groups shape the content of law is 
currently unfolding in Canada. Here Health and Safety legislation is being 
reconfigured to change the responsibility for work place safety 16. Under new 
legislation workers who do not exercise “individual responsibility” in relation to 
work processes can be sanctioned by health and safety officers. So, for 
example, a worker who does not refuse to work in unsafe conditions now 
bears some of the responsibility for any violations of health and safety that 
may result. The research evidence, though limited, suggests that this system 
sanctions frontline workers more than high-risk employers and that employer 
responsibility reduces the more closely the violation is related to the actual 
production process. While it may be initially intuitive that workers should share 
responsibility in this way it ignores the actuality of workplace relations. 
Theoretically it may seem reasonable that employees should refuse to work in 
unsafe conditions but in reality this is seldom a practical option for them and is 
more likely to result in their dismissal and replacement than in the remedy of 
workplace conditions. This form of legislation is, as Grey has put it, “a neo-
liberal form of blaming the victim” 17. 
 
The role of powerful interests in shaping the content of the law and where the 
boundary between administrative and criminal law falls is a theme of 
considerable vintage in the sociology of the law whether it is the work of 
William Chambliss18 on the Opium Acts or Carson 19 on the Factory Acts and 
the regulation of offshore safety in the oil industry. However this kind of 
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research has taken a more subtle and developed turn in the work of Doreen 
McBarnet 20. She has show how corporations do not necessarily have to 
directly influence the content of the law but they have at their disposal a series 
of ways in they can comply with the law yet defeated its purpose. The best-
known example is that of “creative compliance” with corporate and tax law. 
This is the practice of using the letter of the law to defeat its spirit and to do so 
with impunity” (ND. P1). McBarnet calls this “regulatory arbitrage”, “the 
practice of structuring an inappropriate transaction so its stays within the 
bounds set by a rule” 21. But she argues that much of what passes as creative 
compliance is actually illegal. However it is presented in ways that makes its 
criminality difficult to detect.. 
 
Among the strategies used to achieve creative compliance is the 
management of disclosure. This is where all the relevant information is 
provided but in such an arcane way that it is difficult to interpret it’s meaning. 
The fact that firms negotiate with revenue, for example, means that they can 
also negotiate what and how they disclose, thus turning the encounter into a 
“gaming exercise” and so undermining “the rhetoric of full disclosure as a 
practical reality” 22. McBarnet refers to this as the “non-disclosing disclosure”.  
 
The strategies also include consultation with the revenue but consultation that 
only asks the Revenue questions that lead to particular answers - the ones 
that suit your purposes, - through hiding the relevant facts in “a welter of 
irrelevances” 23 or in different and well spread out parts of documents, the use 
of presentational devices that misdirect attention from larger issues to smaller 
ones, and the strategic use of legal opinion, know also as opinion shopping. 
Such behaviours avoid the stigma of criminality and prevent those who use 
them being labelled “criminal”. 
 
It is easy to dismiss these behaviours as “gaming the system” and they are 
regarded in business circles as legitimate and “clever”24. But they have 
serious consequences. One is that financial reports become unreliable, a 
case highlighted by the example of Enron. The use of certain accounting 
devices, endorsed by accountants and financial advisers, meant that their 
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financial reports were no guide to their actual financial status and this may 
actually have misled the market. “Enron could use the different rules of tax 
and accounting to simultaneously report huge profits to the SEC and claim tax 
losses, and huge refunds, in its tax returns”25. They reported profits under one 
set of rules and showed a profit and then reported their accounts under 
another set of rules which showed they were making a loss and so paid no 
tax. The fact that the size of executive salaries and bonuses were based on 
the profits rather than the loss figures may also be relevant here. The way in 
which Enron executives were prosecuted and the narrow range of the charges 
against them meant that “the murkier waters of creative accounting” were 
never challenged and have not gone away26. 
 
This manipulation of legal boundaries is also present in the notion of “legal 
corruption”. Transparency International defines this as the “abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain” 27. In a report on corruption on Ireland from 2006 to 
2009, they conclude that there is very little of what they call “petty” corruption 
such as the bribing of officials. Similarly they find that there is little evidence 
that the kind of fraud and corruption that characterised the 1980s and 1990s 
and that was the subject of a range of tribunals is still a feature of the system.  
 
What it did find however is that “Ireland is regarded by domestic and 
international observers as suffering high levels of legal corruption”. It defines 
this as situations where political policy and political decisions are “believed” to 
be influenced by personal connections, patronage, political favours and 
donations to politicians and political parties. It sees the risks of corruption as 
high in relation to appointments to public bodies, a power in the control of 
individual ministers, in the the funding of political parties where “influence-
selling has yet to be completely outlawed”, where political lobbying is 
unregulated, where political parties do not have to publish accounts and 
where the public contracting system is open to “significant abuse”. The risk of 
corruption is especially problematic in local government where there is a “lack 
of adequate safeguards against planning corruption, false accounting, misuse 
of resources, influence-selling and fraud”. In addition there is insufficient 
recognition of this as few local authorities have contingency plans to deal with 
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fraud and corruption 28. Overall it concludes that the system of governance in 
relation to fraud has important shortcomings, most notably a lack of 
transparency and weak enforcement of regulation in the business and 
financial sectors. And, it needs to be added, the lack of a significant body of 
law to regulate such behaviour. 
 
The notion that whatever about the legal niceties the public do not see this 
kind of behaviour as criminal directs our attention to two issues, one is how 
the public finds out about corporate misbehaviour, or how it is represented in 
the media, and the other is what they think of it and of how it should be dealt 
with, in other words, the question of what the state of public opinion is on such 
behaviour.  Indeed it has been argued that one of the problems getting in the 
way of the consideration of corporate misbehaviour as a crime is the nature of 
media representation29. Again we have very limited research on this in Ireland 
but what we have would suggest that corporate misbehaviour is notable by its 
absence in the media30. While O’Connell found in his analysis of newspaper 
coverage of crime, that there was a disproportionate focus on crime of 
violence these were primarily crimes of interpersonal rather than corporate 
violence. Research in Britain would suggest that when the media covers this 
kind of behaviour there it is done in such a way as to present the behaviour as 
non-criminal and much of the regulation as frivolous.  
 
Thus the media in Britain choose to portray corporate mis-selling of pensions 
from the late 1980s onwards arguably one of the country’s largest corporate 
crimes, as the result of negligence and incompetence rather than as the 
product of criminal intent.  The media have also focussed on minor cases that 
can be shown to be light hearted and then portrayed as examples of heavy 
handed and over zealous regulation. These stories create what Almond31 calls 
“regulatory myths” which can in turn undermine the moral legitimacy of 
regulators and regulatory activity, and in turn have an impact on the 
procedural legitimacy of regulation. By portraying regulators as over officious 
and kill joys, Almond says that these stories, are “potential catalysts of 
regulatory delegitimation” 32. 
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One of the most notorious cases was the allegation that health and safety 
officers in the North of England had banned school children from playing with 
chestnuts unless they wore safety goggles. A more detailed analysis of the full 
circumstances shows that this was not imposed by a regulator but by a 
teacher involved as part of a publicity stunt. Many such stories have 
subsequently been shown either to have a different meaning when situated in 
their correct context or else to be simply untrue. Their impact has not been 
limited by this and they have become “shorthand signals of generalised 
regulatory inappropriateness”33. Such stories have also been linked into the 
template of compensation culture, the extent of which is often overstated and 
the consequences of which are to trivialise corporate misbehaviour and to 
trivialise and undermine regulation.  
 
It is difficult to think of any law or set of regulations in the area of criminal 
justice that are subject to this level of ridicule or in which the enforcers come 
under the level of criticism to which those who regulate the corporate world 
are subject. Yet there are a number of areas in which there could be 
legitimate arguments, most notably the area of the regulation of illegal drugs 
in which the state expends serious amounts of money with what would 
appears to be limited signs of success.  There is little evidence of any 
shortage of illegal drugs in the country or of people willing to sell them. 
 
However despite the media coverage there is evidence that the nature of 
public opinion on corporate crime is changing. It is often assumed that the 
criminalisation of such behaviour would not have a basis in a supportive 
public opinion and not achieve the degree of legitimacy that such laws would 
require for their successful implementation. In the United States, for example, 
the debate on white collar and corporate crime has moved to a different 
dimension and in a different direction to that which underlies many of the 
essays in this book. Research would suggest that the desire of the public and 
the balance of public opinion is that the criminal law needs to be expanded to 
encompass to cover more forms of corporate misbehaviour. This is very much 
against what the received wisdom had been in the past where the tendency 
has been to change the law to reduce the level of regulation on corporate 
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behaviour.  It was widely believed that the relatively benign attitudes of the 
public to corporate misbehaviour coupled with apathy and ignorance about 
such behaviour were an impediment to using the criminal law to control 
corporations. There was, as John Conklin has pointed out, “widespread 
acceptance of the view that the public is ‘condoning, indifferent, or ambivalent’ 
towards business crime”.34 This has been changed by a number of recent 
scandals, most significantly those of Enron and World.Com, and the recent 
collapse of the banking system, and by the general loss of faith in the lax 
regulation that made these forms of behaviour possible. 
 
As a result public opinion very much favours a more punitive approach to 
such behaviour and a greater willingness to use the criminal law against 
corporate offenders. According to Frances Cullen and his colleagues35 
attitudes towards corporate crime have transformed in the last few years. 
They characterise public opinion as having gone through three phases since 
the 1970s. The first was when the public were indifferent to business crime, 
the second was a period of rising attention marked by an increased 
awareness of business crime and a third period, that of transformed attention, 
when there is significant social support for sending corporate offenders to 
prison. While they see this as in many ways a significant development, they 
are concerned that a focus on individual “bad guys and on the need to punish 
them” may deflect “attention away from the structural and political conditions 
that made many of the most egregious scandals possible”.36 There is also the 
outstanding question of the degree to which such attitudes influence or over-
ride the wishes of corporate elites in the shaping of the law. 
 
What appears to have been important in changing attitudes to corporate crime 
has been the recent financial scandals and in particular those involving global 
and national banking systems. As we have seen it has been important in 
changing attitudes to corporate crime in the United States and and it has also 
been a significant factor in Finland. In the absence of polling data in Ireland it 
is difficult to determine if the desire to use the criminal sanction against 
corporate offenders has a supportive basis in public opinion though in the 
wake of the collapse of the banking system there was some political support 
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for it. John Gormley, the then Minister for the Environment said that there was 
a need for the use of the criminal law against white collar offenders. He cited 
the United States in his justification. “In the United States”, he said, “you see 
people who are white collar criminal led out in handcuffs. I want to see the 
same regime in Ireland” (Irish Times, 13th February, 2009). The Association of 
Garda Sergeants and Inspectors wanted to see more prosecutions against 
bankers” and spoke about the “apparent weaknesses in dealing with white 
collar crime” (Irish Independent, 7th April, 2009). The Minister for Finance was 
more energised. He wanted them “pursued to the gates of hell”, though he 
didn’t make clear whether he wanted them to bypass Mountjoy in the process. 
If, as Ruggiero and Walsh claim, reputational intermediaries” …”collude with 
corporate executives to give legitimacy to their illegal schemes”37, then in this 
case they would appear to be doing the opposite, suggesting that such 
executives be subject to the force of the criminal law. It is, however, useful to 
remember that Bertie Ahern in his role as Minister for Finance in 1994 said 
that he looked forward to seeing tax evaders going to prison. This was said in 
the context of the introduction of an amnesty for tax evasion, at a time when 
Ahern had received in excess of €50,000 in unacknowledged “donations, 
which could open him to a charge of tax evasion, and it was a statement that 
did not alter the already “abysmally low” level of prosecution and 
imprisonment of such offenders. 
 
As Nils Christie says it is hard to imagine zero tolerance being applied to 
economic crime”. 38 “The international evidence would suggest that a key 
element in the criminalisation of corporate misbehaviour and “a precondition 
for economic crime being tackled with any degree of efficacy” does not 
necessarily lie with policy makers and politicians but with the pressure that 
can be put on them by, what Sutherland (1983: 60) called, the “organised 
resentment” of the general public. 39 The pressure needs a basis in an 
organized social movement and when it has this, as Snider 40 shows, it can be 
successful. Such successes are however fairly limited and in a country such 
as Ireland, as Transparency International shows, the extent of such citizen 
movement is low. There may be diffuse support for the use of criminal 
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sanctions against corporate offenders but it is unlikely to transform itself into 
the kind of social movement that would be successful in making this possible. 
 
The Issue of Enforcement and Agency Capture 
 
Michael McDowell in his paper says that compliance with company law was at 
an abysmally low level in the late 1990s. The working group that he chaired 
concluded that criminal law alone was not enough as a form of corporate 
regulation and argued for the availability of sanctions “wholly outside the 
process of criminal justice”. However the justification for this is interesting. 
This is that when the criminal law was the only route available for dealing with 
corporate behaviour prosecutions were rare and though he does not mention 
it, it is unlikely that terms of imprisonment resulted from these prosecutions.  
This leads him to consider the case for administrative sanctions and other 
sanctions for such behaviour and to tease out the question of whether these 
are compatible with the Irish constitution. 
 
What is interesting here is the way in which this is at odds with a long tradition 
in the study of corporate crime that has argued consistently for the use of the 
criminal law against these kinds of offenders and that argues that in the light 
of recent scandals this case has become more urgent and insistent. While 
debates in other countries can revolve around the strengthening of the 
criminal law and its greater use in the regulation of criminal law, here it would 
appear that we are seeking to avoid it. 
 
What this response to corporate behaviour diverts attention away from is a 
more detailed and nuanced analysis of why if the criminal law exists it is 
underutilised. That fact that it requires a higher standard of evidence and 
proof is not sufficient. There are other areas of criminal law where when the 
standard of proof has proved difficult to achieve we have simply changed the 
law. Vaughan and Kilcommins 41 have documented this fairly extensively but 
the Criminal Assets Bureau is perhaps a good example, using, as it does, a 
civil standard of proof to pursue what are in effect criminal activities. Equally 
so is the law on what constitutes organised criminality, the criteria for which 
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seem to the non-legal person is be fairly loose and of a fairly low standard. 
Amendments to the right to silence, restrictions on bail and the extension of 
the time periods for which suspects can be questioned would also fit the bill. 
So it hard to accept that these are the main barriers to the use of the criminal 
law against corporate offenders. There must be more to it than that. 
 
Similar issues arise in the consideration of regulation and that faith that some 
of the papers in this volume have in it. It seems to be assumed that once a 
process of regulation is established regulation follows in some straight line or 
unproblematic format. It is not that simple. Take the current situation in 
Ireland. There appears now to be general agreement that the crisis on the 
Irish banking system was facilitated by poor regulation, an attitude epitomised 
by the Irish Times editorial (14th January 2009) with the headline, “Bad 
Policing, Bad banking”. It went on to say that “[T]he Irish Financial Services 
Regulatory Authority is a badly broken organisation”… [Instead] of closely 
supervising the banks and their staff, the regulator trusted them to act 
responsibly”. They didn’t. The fact that the relationship was based on trust is 
in many ways as classic example of regulatory capture. This is the way in 
which regulation is circumvented by the fact that the regulator comes to see 
the world from the point of view of the regulated and structures his or her 
intervention accordingly, a process facilitated by the similarity of social 
background and mindset between the regulator and the regulated. 
 
This phenomenon has been identified in a wide range of research on 
regulation. In some cases it is at the level of being involved in the design of 
the system through which the industry is regulated, where “the subject 
industry plays a key role in its own regulatory design”. 42 This, for example, 
was the case with the asbestos industry in the United States. It is also, as we 
have seen, the case in the regulation of the antiques industry to disrupt the 
market in illegally obtained antiques.  This kind of behaviour has been 
described as “regulation as performativity” where regulators create the 
impression that they are regulating but are doing nothing of the kind. 
 
 14 
Justin O’Brien’ has claimed that outside Ireland the belief is that the regulatory 
system here has “been captured” (Irish Times, 9th January, 2006). In the Irish 
case it would appear that the shape of the regulation that emerged was the 
result of internal politics through which the Central Bank successfully resisted 
the attempt to set up a new independent regulatory body and as a result 
created a regulator that failed. There was serious confusion in the bank 
between its belief that the need to maintain the stability of the banking system 
was as much a matter of creating the impression of regulation and stability 
rather than ensuring that the stability was securely based. Hence the 
obsession in Irish financial circles with the notion that speaking publically 
about problems in the banking system was a form of treachery in that it 
suggested that the emperor had no clothes. Perhaps the most direct 
illustration of the way regulation and impression management was subsumed 
into each other was that fact that the regulator and the Central Bank operated 
out of the same building. 
 
The comments of Richard Painter Professor of Law at the University of 
Minnesota would also suggest that there is more to it than simply a matter of 
law. He argues that the United States has more criminal statutes covering 
corporate behaviour than any other country but has relatively few 
prosecutions, though he argues that it is mainly because of “prosecutorial 
difficulties” (Irish Times, 28th February 2009). 
 
The case of insider dealing in Fyffes/DCC is usually cited as a relevant 
example in an Irish context of the difficulties of establishing guilt in a corporate 
crime case. But there are examples of similar complexities in cases of what 
might be regarded as ordinary crime. The complex technological evidence 
given in the murder case against James O’Reilly for the murder of his wife is a 
case in point. It clearly was understood and accepted by the jury. They found 
him guilty. Colm Keena has also argued that the complexity of corporate 
crime cases may not “be entirely due to the law but down to the fact that “the 
people against whom the allegations are made are usually well heeled and 
can engage expensive legal teams” (Irish Times, 28th February, 2009). 
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There might be a more prosaic explanation for the unwillingness to initiate 
prosecutions in cases of corporate crime, that of resources. The Office of 
Corporate Enforcement has been looking for extra staff since 2005 as the 
Director of Corporate Enforcement has pointed out that his current level of 
staffing was “wholly inadequate” (Irish Times, 28th February 2009). But even 
allowing for that, there is clear evidence that the system of regulating 
corporate behaviour has been seriously compromised by explicit or implicit 
collusion between the regulator and the regulated. There is no direct 
equivalent with the enforcers of the criminal law and the criminals against 
whom it is enforced.  
 
The example of the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) is relevant here. 
Though perceived locally as one of the successes of the Celtic Tiger its 
international reputation is somewhat less benign. The spokesperson for the 
British Liberal Party described it as “Liechtenstein on the Liffey”. He didn’t 
mean it as a complement but as a description of the lax regulation that applied 
there. Firms are attracted to the IFSC because of this and according to 
O’Toole, because of the way in which facilitates “avoidance of tax by British 
corporations” (Irish Times, 17th February 2009). Justin O’Brien said that the 
IFSC was perceived as the wild west of the financial industry and “the wider 
regulatory community now perceives Dublin as a rogue market” (Irish Times, 
9th January, 2006). According to him, investigations in the United States and 
Australia concluded that “loopholes on the governance of the reinsurance 
industry created systematic risks. Each has identified Dublin as the weakest 
link in the enforcement firmament”. 
 
Then there is the relationship between dodgy corporations and the law, a 
dilemma captured in the book title “It aint illegal but is it right?” (Passos and 
Goodwin, 2004). This arises very clearly in the context of the behaviour of 
Anglo-Irish Bank directors and their shifting of money with Irish Nationwide. 
The legal status of these activities is unclear but politicians and business 
leaders have already adjudicated on that. Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan 
is, we are told, “disappointed about the actions, although not illegal”. The now 
retired Financial Regulator is quoted as saying that “it does not appear that 
 16 
anything illegal took place in relation to these loans”, an attitude that may 
explain why he is no longer the regulator. Finally the CEO of Dublin Chamber 
of Commerce said, “I think it is worth remembering that this wasn’t an illegal 
practice” (quotes from Irish Times, 20th January 2009)  
 
Corporate Crime and the Penal Sanction 
 
The final concern that needs to be addressed and that is seen as preventing 
the application of criminal sanctions to corporate misbehaviour is the alleged 
ineffectiveness of such sanctions in the case of corporate behaviour. 
This is the notion that penal sanctions will not work against corporate 
offenders. Quite why this is the case is seldom made explicit but would seem 
to consist of two different propositions. One is the unlikelihood that courts 
would give custodial sentences to corporate offenders and the second is if 
they did they are unlikely to have a deterrent effect. There are a number of 
difficulties with these arguments. The main one is that because so few 
corporate offenders are sent to prison we have no idea about the 
effectiveness of prison and about its deterrent value. As Alvesalo and Tombs 
put it in relation, to corporate crime, “experiments in punitive-based 
enforcement … are relatively rare”. 44 
 
The other problem with this argument is that lurking within it is the notion that 
while imprisonment may not be appropriate for corporate offenders there are 
offenders for whom it is. Quite who these are is not immediately obvious. 
Judged purely as a deterrent device there is little evidence that prison has this 
effect on its “traditional” population, those who commit “ordinary” crime. There 
is some dispute in Ireland about the proportion of those in prison who have 
served previous custodial sentences, or what is known as the rate of 
recidivism. O’Mahony 45 claims that about 90% of those imprisoned in 
Mountjoy had served previous prison sentences, a feature that gave Ireland 
the dubious distinction of having one of the highest rates of recidivism in the 
developed world. A more extended piece of research by O’Donnell, Baumer 
and Hughes 46 did a follow up on all prisoners released form Irish prisons 
between 2001 and 2004. It looked at the proportion that re-entered prison by 
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the end of 2004 thus looking at recidivism over a period of between one 
months and four years after their release. It concluded that the rate of 
recidivism was lower than what it is generally considered to be. Around half of 
those released from prison were back in again within four years. The lower 
figure here may be attributable to the number of sex offenders in the sample, 
a group with a low level of recidivism though whether this is due to desistance 
or to them being more adept at evading further exposure is open to question. 
Recidivism was highest among young, uneducated, poorly employed and 
illiterate young men, the traditional foundation of the prison system. So the 
evidence that a penal sanction is appropriate here is weak. 
 
Yet there are reasons to suspect that a penal deterrent might work with 
corporate offenders. These lie in the nature of their crimes. With traditional 
property crimes there is evidence that much of it is unplanned and 
opportunistic, so the issue of deterrence does not enter into their calculations. 
Most property crime is a random and impulsive response to perceived criminal 
opportunities. The same may be true of other kinds of crime. A recent study of 
street robbers (known more colloquially as muggers) in England and Wales 
showed that there was little planning and a lot of impulse involved. 47 Indeed 
the researchers concluded that it was difficult to regard their involvement in 
crime as part of a rational decision-making process, it “could reasonably be 
argued that they are not really decisions at all but rather the almost inevitable 
result of a street-oriented life style”. 48 
 
By contrast corporate crime is more calculated, more planned and more the 
product of conscious decision and intent. 49 It is better explained through 
theories of rational choice than is more traditional crime and so is more open 
to being deterred by a prior knowledge of the consequences. If this knowledge 
does not involve the perception that a penal sanction is a possibility then the 
prevention of such behaviour is unlikely. This is evidenced in the fact that, 
according to many researchers, levels of recidivism are high for corporate 
offenders, a realisation that is as old as Sutherland’s work. The evidence that 
the use of penal penalties is effective against, for example, tax evaders is 
limited, but there is evidence that when it is used in specific circumstances it 
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can be effective against corporate criminals. 50 Again however the limited 
nature of such research has to be noted. This may at one level be an obstacle 
to progress in this area but it also indicates the way in which research in 
criminology has reproduced standards definitions of crime by being more 
interests in street rather than suite crime. 
 
A further argument that has been used here is that many of the people who 
are currently imprisoned are there for crimes that involve the use or threat of 
the use of violence. As such they are the kinds of people that society needs to 
protect itself against and the best way to ensure this is to imprison them.  
However this is being narrowly construed if it is seen as a justification for 
keeping corporate offenders out of prison. Many of the offences they have 
been involved in, such as those relating to dangerous working conditions, the 
sale of dangerous products, and the pollution of the environment, involve 
violence against workers, consumers and the wider society respectively. At 
the height of a major panic about street assaults in the United States it 
emerged that American workers were at greater risk of injury in the workplace 
than they were in the street. As Beirne and Messerschmidt put it, “we are 
safer almost anywhere than the workplace”. 51 
 
Finally if the argument against the use of criminal sanctions is put entirely in 
the context of effectiveness, and as we have pointed out, it is not one that 
applies very well to prison anyway, then this misses a crucial feature of a 
penal sanction. This is its expressive purpose. It is one of the ultimate 
statement of what society considers harmful. It is one of the definitive ways in 
which social boundaries are set, reinforced and reproduced. And it is one of 
the ways in which this is communicated to citizens. The absence of equality in 
the use of the penal sanction reinforces a pattern of inequalities that is 
present in the wider society and recreates the basic power structure of 
society.  As Carson said “the power to criminalise is one of the most powerful 
ones that the state has at its disposal”. 52 It is important that it is used in a way 
that emphasises the equality of citizens. Excluding corporate offenders from 
the possibility of serving prison sentences for their misbehaviour is not a good 
place to start. 
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Conclusion 
 
Much of the debate on corporate crime assumes that such behaviour is 
different to what we might characterise as “ordinary” crime. The argument of 
this paper has been that corporate crime is indeed different but the manner in 
which it is different does not come from the nature of the behaviour involved 
but from the way in which this behaviour is treated in society. Corporate 
misbehaviour is different because business and commercial elites play a 
central role in the design of the laws that shape whether their behaviour is 
defined as criminal or not. They also have the power and influence to 
compromise systems of regulation and their behaviour is immune from the 
threat of a penal sanction. 
 
Because of the differences in the way we respond to corporate and ordinary 
crime, the criminal justice system “systematically reinforces extant power 
relations” 53. The differences between both kinds of behaviour do not lie in the 
levels of social harm that they cause. For both kinds of behaviour these can 
be substantial. The differences are in the social position and relative power of 
the people who engage in such behaviours. To repeat and recycle a 
hackneyed but still accurate phrase, the justice system operates in such a 
way that “the rich get richer and the poor get prison”. 54 
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